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Contact tracing can be beneficial, such as helping to curb the spread of disease,
but the handling of the resulting data poses privacy-related risks. This article
provides some lessons learned and recommendations regarding the application of
the NIST Privacy Framework.
Pandemics affect the security of sovereignstates byweakening their economies, defenses,and the overall wellbeing of their citizenries. For
example, in March 2020, many of the crew members of
the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt either con-
tracted or were exposed to the COVID-19 virus.1 In addi-
tion to the impact on the health and safety of the
sailors, the carrier battle group could not conduct oper-
ations for several months in the Indo-Pacific theater of
operations. A year later, as part of his Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance, U.S. President Joe Biden
cited the COVID-19 pandemic as one of the “biggest
threats”America has faced.2
The COVID-19 pandemic led some healthcare
experts and government officials to advocate for insti-
tuting automated contact tracing and notification.3
Automated contact tracing is the tracking of whether
an individual has been in proximity to a person that
has tested positive for an infectious disease for long
enough to constitute exposure. Contact notification is
the act of informing an exposed individual soon after
authorities establish that the individual’s contact
tested positive for the disease.
Automated contact tracing and notification, when
used in combination with preventative measures (such
as vaccinating people and encouraging social distanc-
ing) and reactive measures (such as quarantining and
providing medical care), can contribute to curbing the
spread of infectious diseases.4 However, for some peo-
ple automating contact tracing conjures up images of
an Orwellian society in which the surveillance of the
population by a government strips individuals of much
or all of their privacy and other civil liberties. The public
policy decision-making process must balance social
norms and civil liberties with the value and legality of
options available to curtail the effects of an epidemic or
a pandemic on national security. Recent research, such
that of Cohen, Gostin, and Weitzner, explores the ten-
sions between civil liberties and contact tracing, inform-
ing the ongoing public-policy debate over contact
tracing.5
Our aim in this article is to enhance information
technology (IT) professionals’ awareness of some of
the challenges they will face and available tools for
managing privacy-related risks. Many IT professionals
will be or already are tasked with acquiring automated
contact-tracing systems, integrating those systems
with other information systems, and sustaining the
contact-tracing systems. As with cybersecurity, real-
world information systems are less than perfect at
protecting private data, but measures can be taken to
minimize the severity and frequency of privacy-related
harms. At the time of this writing, the U.S. Department
of the Navy (DoN) is acquiring an automated contact-
tracing capability.6 Here we share our lessons learned
from applying the U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) Privacy Framework7 to perform
a privacy-risk assessment for an abstracted model of
the DoN’s contact-tracing system.
Shift FromManual to Automated
Contact Tracing
The DoN is no stranger to pandemics. Readiness of
the Fleet suffered during the 1918 Pandemic, when
approximately 40% of U.S. Navy personnel contracted
influenza.8 The spread of influenza throughout Europe
and beyond was exacerbated by the movement of
armed combatants and civilians.
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Manual methods of contact tracing do not scale
well for epidemics and pandemics, as the world popula-
tion is currently about 7.9 billion. Even the combined
total of Navy active-duty personnel and reservists is
close to half a million. Manual methods do not support
timely strategic or tactical decision-making. For the cur-
rent acquisition, theDoN requires the collection, storage,
processing, and transmission of data to be automated.
For the DoN automated contact-tracing system,
data will be collected through edge computing devi-
ces, specifically wearables, that have built-in sensing
and communication capability.
Automation addresses the scaling problem, the
data-collection requirement, and the need for present-
ing data in a timely manner to decision-makers. How-
ever, automation introduces risks for the DoN, and
there are legal, policy, and technical constraints on
the degree of automation and the application of con-
tract tracing. We now turn to privacy-related risks and
their management.
Privacy Risks
Let us start our exploration of privacy risks by taking a
bird’s eye view of how the contact-tracing system will
operate. Per the request for information, the system
will rely on proximity data consisting of contact and
time metadata generated by Bluetooth beacons on a
person’s wearable device. Edge servers collect the
data from the network of wearables, process the data,
then securely transmit the data to remote data cen-
ters. Data analytics can then be used to determine,
given reports of new instances of positive test cases
for COVID-19 or other infectious diseases, which of
the people participating in the DoN’s contact-tracing
program were in close proximity to confirmed infec-
tious individuals, followed by notificaiton.
The Navy’s Jupiter enterprise data management
system serves as a central clearinghouse of informa-
tion. Jupiter can support secondary processing of
proximity and COVID-19 incident data to create fleet
readiness products for high-level decision makers.9 In
our model of the system, we assume that proximity
data will be correlated with COVID-19 incident data
from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED)—
the DoN’s healthcare activity—and other ancillary
data needed for disease prevention and mitigation
actions.
The proximity-tracing technology will use some
form of unique identifier that the user device broad-
casts. Other users within range of that device record
that unique identifier and record the times that they
were within a certain distance from that user, with
distance measures computed using the radio-fre-
quency equipped wearable’s Received Signal Strength
Indicator (RSSI) and with Time-of-Flight (TOF) values
(i.e., based on ranging, computing distance between
two wireless nodes using detected signal strength and
measured roundtrip time of data-packet exchange,
respectively). If a user tests positive for COVID-19, the
system uses the proximity data to determine which
other users may be at risk of infection, then notifies
the affected users.
Two prominent factors that play in the DoN’s con-
tact-tracing privacy-risk calculus are the potential mis-
handling and inadvertent release of privacy-sensitive
data. There is a risk that contact-tracing data could be
used for unauthorized purposes. Some contact tracing
systems allow a central authority to have access to all
of the data that is collected from users. This central
authority may have the ability to reidentify and isolate
specific users’ proximity data. This opens up the
opportunity for someone to abuse the system and
track certain users, potentially placing those users in
dangerous or compromising situations.
There is also the risk that someone not authorized
and without a need for access could discover privacy-
sensitive data by making inferences from the data
that has not been sufficiently deidentified, and even
go a step further by using the data for nonsanctioned
purposes such as creating graphs of social networks
of users. Recent studies have shown that proximity
beacons can be used to infer the social graph and
movement of users using machine learning techni-
ques.10 However, this is not just a privacy risk. It is also
an operational security for the DoN.
Managing Privacy Risks
While the preceding examples of privacy risk can be
fairly common across contact-tracing systems, the
level of risk, measured as a function of severity and
frequency of occurrence, will vary from one system to
another. Fortunately, risk can be managed, but this
requires an organization to: identify the risks; specify
each risk in terms of frequency and severity (i.e., how
often might a particular privacy harm occur and what
is the degree of harm involved); prioritize the handling
of the each instance of risk; and adjust as necessary
and employ its plan for managing the risks. This will
support executive-level leaders and members of their
workforce to make informed privacy-risk decisions
and implement privacy controls commensurate with
decision-makers’ desired level of risk acceptance.
Risk management is necessary for preserving
human dignity and protecting civil liberties. This is
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codified in numerous privacy-related laws, regulations,
and policy for handling privacy-sensitive data. For
example, the Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SEC-
NAVINST) 5211.5F11 implements the DoN Privacy Pro-
gram. SECNAVINST 5211.5F contains broad guidance
on privacy protection and states the privacy of individ-
uals as being a “personal and fundamental right that
will be respected and protected.”While the instruction
focuses on individuals, we assert that organizational
privacy is equally as important to an organization like
the DoN because critical information pertaining to
operations can also be gleaned from data leaked dur-
ing breaches in employee privacy.
In January 2020, NIST released the NIST Privacy
Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy Through
Enterprise Risk Management, Version 1.0.7 The frame-
work’s purpose is to facilitate and encourage the con-
sideration of risks to privacy in the acquisition, use,
and sustainment of information systems that handle
privacy-sensitive data.
The privacy framework closely follows the struc-
ture of NIST’s cybersecurity framework, first released
in 2014.12 The privacy framework consists of functions
that represent different areas of privacy-risk manage-
ment. The purpose of the functional areas is to help
organizations identify privacy risk and build profiles of
their organizations’ privacy activities and risk toler-
ance, including where they hope to be in the future.
The framework then uses Implementation Tiers to pro-
vide a grading scale for organizations to determine if
they are in a position to adequately handle their cur-
rent privacy risk. NIST also provides a mapping of pri-
vacy-related risks to controls in Special Publication
800-53 rev5. NIST plans to incorporate more mappings
of this type into the framework.13,14
Lessons Learned From Applying the
Framework
The newness of the NIST Privacy Framework means
there is a dearth of reports, experiences, and lessons
learned from applying it. We started from a clean slate,
lacking relevant reports to direct our application of
the framework to a conceptual model we have of the
DoN’s Bluetooth-based proximity-tracing system. Our
model captures key characteristics of a system the
DoN planned to acquire while leaving irrelevant details
abstracted away.6
To establish a baseline, we first conducted privacy-
risk modeling without the aid of the privacy frame-
work. Then, we applied the NIST Privacy Framework,
with the aim of answering the question: How does the
guidance contained in the privacy framework help us
in identifying the same threats that we already identi-
fied in our risk model. We used the NIST SP 800-53,
Rev5 Crosswalk to choose core functions, categories,
subcategories, and their corresponding controls that
we felt applied to our conceptual model of the DoN
contact-tracing system. We produced what the frame-
work terms a Profile; a Profile is an assessment of the
privacy risks of the system being assessed.
We observed that the framework led us through a
nonthreatening checklist-style process, but left us with
the impression thatwewere notmaking significant prog-
ress in identifying or mitigating privacy risks. For exam-
ple, there is a Core Function in the framework that
focuses on Risk Management. Many of the NIST SP 800-
53mapped controls directed us to the RiskManagement
chapter in the NIST SP 800-53. One lesson learned was
that a framework that lists risk-management aspects
and then points to a chapter in a publication that also
explains broad risk-management controls did not make
us noticeably more effective at performing risk manage-
ment. We understand that NIST made a conscious deci-
sion to minimize the inclusion of detailed guidance and
instead provided the user of the framework with plenty
of room for maneuver in interpreting the “what” and
“how” of conducting privacy-risk management. This, we
conclude, is a double-edged sword—lack of detail ena-
bles flexibility but limits the utility of the framework as a
source ofmeaningful guidance.
The framework includes many security-specific
categories, subcategories, and controls. While security
is important and inseparable from privacy, most of the
content appeared to be a copy/paste from the cyber-
security framework.
We also noticed that the framework did not give
disassociability the attention that it deserves. While
disassociability is represented as a subcategory, we
expected the framework to provide more guidance
regarding deidentifying data due to the prominence of
privacy concerns related to data analytics and Big
Data. Deidentifying data is a critical capability for the
DoN’s contact-tracing system and its secondary use
cases. Note that deidentifying data is a concern that
is also detached from the commonplace security con-
trols that accompany privacy.
In addition, we found that the framework helped us
the most as a risk-identification guide. It did not help
us much with considering the likelihood of privacy
harms occurring or the severity of their consequences,
or how to find or specify risk tolerance. We found that
the user of the framework needs to fill in a lot of gaps
in the guidance on privacy-risk management.
We also found that much of the NIST Privacy
Framework is similar to the NIST Cybersecurity
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Framework. Privacy and security are related concepts
and many of the control families between the two
overlap. This is to be expected, as security breaches
can often have substantial privacy implications, as
when the U.S. Office of Personnel Management’s data-
bases of human resources records were compromised
in a breach announced in June 2015.15 We propose
that the two frameworks be combined, since they are
insufficiently differentiated. This enables consolida-
tion of the controls for security and privacy, matching
the structure of NIST SP 800-53 rev5. Nevertheless,
we recommend that the combined framework high-
light and provide guidance for managing privacy-spe-
cific risks above and beyond cybersecurity risks.
Furthermore, we conclude that combining the two
frameworks would also streamline the assessment
process for IT professionals. From day one of our work
with the privacy framework, we asked the question:
Given that the NIST SP 800-53 rev5 contains both pri-
vacy and security controls, what purpose is served by
publishing two separate frameworks—one for privacy,
the other for security? At present the U.S. government
requires its acquisition professionals to integrate risk
assesssments under the cybersecurity framework into
their acquisition-and-sustainment decision-making
(part of guidance included in the U.S. government’s
Risk Management Framework publications16 driven by
the Federal Information Security Management Act,
FISMA17). At present, this is often operationalized for
service-oriented tools—like the automated contact-
tracing system we consider—by the vendor undergo-
ing certification under the General Services Adminis-
tration’s Federal Risk and Authorization Management
Program (FedRAMP).18 For systems acquired by DoD
(and other National Security Systems), vendor require-
ments will soon shift to the new Cybersecurity Matu-
rity Model Certification (CMMC) process.19 As
requirements shift across the landscape, we view it as
being only a matter of time before the NIST Privacy
Framework and possibly other privacy guidance will
be mandated for use in government acquisition of IT.
Consolidation with existing frameworks and guidance,
as proposed here, could result in dedupication of
effort by IT professionals to meet privacy-risk manage-
ment needs.
There is still much to be learned about managing
privacy risk, as our initial foray in applying the NIST Pri-
vacy Framework has shown. Information systems that
handle privacy-sensitive data extends well beyond just
contact-tracing applications. It will be interesting to
see how the NIST Privacy Framework and other pri-
vacy frameworks evolve based on feedback from the
IT community.
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